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Abstract:  
We use longitudinal linked employer-employee data and find that the probability of 
participating in firm-sponsored classroom training diminishes rapidly for workers aged 45 
years and older. Although the standard human capital investment model predicts such a 
decline, we also consider the possibility that returns to training decline with age. Taking 
into account endogenous training decisions, we find that the training wage premium 
diminishes only slightly with age. However, estimates of the impact of training on 
productivity decrease dramatically with age, suggesting that incentives for firms to invest 
in classroom training are much lower for older workers. 
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21. Introduction
One of the consequences of a continually increasing life expectancy is its eﬀect on
work and retirement decisions. Even though many individuals now stay in the work-
force well into their 60s and 70s, many abilities valued in the workplace decline with
age (especially after 55 years of age).1 One of the ways in which firms and workers may
attempt to increase worker productivity, or at least slow its decline with age, is through
firm-sponsored classroom (FSC) training.2 This is in fact one of the key recommen-
dation of OECD (2006) as part of a synthesis of 21 country-specific reports on aging
and employment policies.3 However, previous research suggests that the incidence of
FSC training declines with age (Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce (2000)) - begging the
question as to why firms do not use such a strategy to counteract the aforementioned
productivity decline.
There are two basic theories as to why FSC training might decline with age. The
main and first one explains lower training incidence as due to a shorter amortization
period of investments. In a Becker-type model, human capital investments should occur
early on in an individual’s life in order to maximize the returns from such investments
over a maximum amount of time.
Second, it is possible that FSC training declines with age simply because its con-
temporaneous returns also decline with age. That is, younger workers may benefit
more from training than their older counterparts at any moment in time. This could
be due to decreased ability to learn with age or simply because younger workers have
more to learn from the current forms of FSC training than older workers. Either way,
if such is the case, increasing training for older workers will unlikely yield meaningful
productivity gains. That is, firms may be optimally setting FSC training at lower rates
for older workers simply because of its decreased returns. If such is the case, subsidies
to such programs may encourage ineﬃciently high levels of training for certain groups.
In this paper, we start by quantifying the relationship between age and the prob-
ability of receiving FSC training. Next, we estimate age-specific (contemporaneous)
1See Skirbekk (2004) for an overview of the literature and Göbel and Zwick (2009) and Cardoso,
Guimaraes, and Varejão (2010) for recent examples.
2Surveys generally distinguish between on-the-job and classroom training. However, studies comparing
the productivity impact of classroom versus on-the-job training find low or negligible impact of on-the-
job training on productivity. For example, Zwick (2005) finds that formal external and internal courses
have a positive impact on productivity while on-the-job training has a negative impact. Barrett and
O’Connell (2001) find positive impact for general training but not for specific training. Finally, Black
and Lynch (1996) find a positive impact of training only in the case of formal oﬀ-the-job training in
the manufacturing sector. Hence we focus on classroom training.
3See also key recommendations from the Canadian Expert Panel on Older Workers (2008).
3returns of FSC training on both the worker’s wage as well as the worker’s productivity
- neither of which has been estimated previously in the literature to our knowledge. We
estimate the wage-returns using an econometric specification that takes advantage of
the panel and linked nature of the data set by incorporating both worker and workplace
unobserved heterogeneity. By allowing both sources of heterogeneity to be correlated
with the training decision, we can control for the potential endogeneity of the training
decision.
We also estimate productivity returns using a value-added production function in
which labor inputs are disaggregated by age and training status. Some have argued
that estimating the contemporaneous eﬀect of FSC training on productivity provides
a better picture of the true returns to training - especially in an environment of com-
pressed wages (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)). While many studies estimate returns
to training within such a framework, none of these allow returns to training to vary
with age.
In order to map out the FSC age-training profiles and estimate separately the returns
of FSC on wages and productivity, we use data from Statistics Canada’s nationally
representative Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) from 1999 to 2005. One of the
advantages of these longitudinal data is that they follow, and link, workers to firms.
As a result, these data allow, among other things, for a rich structure of unobserved
heterogeneity at both the firm and worker level.4
Our results show that the likelihood of receiving FSC training declines sharply after
age 55. Overall, the probably of receiving classroom training is 4.6 probability points
lower for workers aged 55 to 59 relative to their 35 to 44 counterparts (our comparison
group). The diﬀerence is even more striking for workers aged 60 to 64, whose probability
point diﬀerence of receiving FSC training is 9.6 relative to the comparison group.
This is comparable to recent results from the US by Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce
(2000) who use the 1995 Survey of Employer Training that shows a concave relationship
between age and training. More specifically, they find that the probability of receiving
training rises with age but decreases at a rate of 1.3% annually after the age of 55.5
However, we find that the decline with age is even steeper in a robustness check in
which we use worker fixed eﬀects in a linear probability model to take into account
unobserved diﬀerences at the worker level.
4Abowd and Kramarz (1999a) classify WES as a survey in which both the sample of workplaces and
the sample of workers are cross-sectionally representative of the target population.
5Bishop (1997) summarizes earlier results from US data and concludes that training levels do diminish
significantly with age.
4Our results, taking into account both worker and workplace unobserved heterogene-
ity, suggest that the returns to training on wages also decline with age. More specifi-
cally, we show that a worker aged 25 to 34 who undertakes FSC training earns 1.2%
more than a young worker who do not participate in FSC training. These returns de-
cline to 0.7% for workers aged 55 to 64. Moreover, we find that diﬀerences in duration
of training do not explain this decline. However, our most striking results are obtained
when we estimate the varying impact of FSC training on productivity and find that
contemporaneous productivity-returns to classroom training diminish more markedly
with age. In fact, we find that the impact of FSC training on productivity is close to
nil for older workers.
Taken together, these results suggest that the decrease in the productivity impact
of training is likely to be the main explanation to declining training incidence with age
rather than a Becker-type explanation. Moreover, these results also suggest that the
productivity gains to be expected from policies promoting training for older workers
are likely to be very small, casting doubts on the viability of such policies in the long
run.
In the next section we briefly review the literature on the returns to FSC training
on wages and productivity. After describing our data set, we describe our statistical
models and show our results - that are separated into three diﬀerent subsections. We
first examine how the incidence of FSC training varies with age, we then estimate age-
specific returns to FSC training on wages. Finally, we estimated age-specific returns
to FSC training on productivity. A short conclusion follows.
2. Literature
Studies of the impact of training on workers’ wages are quite extensive. In general,
these studies can be divided into three categories based on the dependent variable stud-
ied. More specifically, they can be divided into groups where the dependent variable
is: (1) the worker’s hourly wage, (2) the wage growth at the worker level, or (3) the
workplace’s wage bill. Studies also vary in how they measure the intensity and the
content of firm-sponsored training. Although in most studies training is measured by
a single dummy variable indicating whether the worker received training in the past
year or not, some allow for more complete information including the duration or money
spent on training.
Theory predicts that training will have a positive impact on all three measure (i.e.,
hourly wage, wage growth and workplace’s wage bill), as long as training increases
the worker productivity and that these increases are reflected in wages (Becker (1964);
5Mincer (1974)). Nonetheless, it is possible that the impact of training on wages will
not fully reflect increases in productivity (i.e., will be smaller) in the presence of a
compressed wage structure (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)).
Despite solid theoretical foundations, it is empirically very diﬃcult to measure the
causal impact of training on wages for two main two reasons. First, there is the usual
problem of unobserved ability bias, where higher ability workers are more likely to
select into training as well as more likely to earn higher wages, causing an upward
bias in the estimated returns to training. Second, few data set track both the worker’s
wage and training history. If past training is correlated with both current training and
current wages, its omission will also likely bias estimated wage returns upwards.
Regardless of the magnitude of its eﬀect, the literature does consistently find positive
wage returns to training. As expected, returns are lower once self-selection into training
is taken into account (Lynch (1992), Veum (1995), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998),
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2005)). There is also
some evidence that returns are lower in more recent studies and lower outside of the
U.S. (Goux and Maurin (2000), Regner (2002) and Bassanini (2006)). In comparison,
our own results (discussed at length below) on the impact of FSC training on wages are
even lower than the ones from the more recent studies from outside the U.S. On average,
we obtain a wage returns close to 1%. This low returns could result from the fact that,
unlike previous studies, we take into account how unobserved characteristics at both
the employee and employer levels can be correlated to training decisions. Furthermore,
we are not aware of any studies presenting diﬀerentials returns of training on wages by
age, which is the main focus of this paper.
There are relatively few studies measuring the impact of training on an objective
measure of worker productivity. This is most likely due to the fact that there are rela-
tively few data sets containing information on both the firm’s productivity (measured
as sales or value-added per worker) and its training practices (Black and Lynch (1996);
Barrett and O’Connell (2001)). Moreover, many studies that do consider the eﬀect of
training on productivity, do so using relatively small samples - calling into question
their generalizability.6
6This is the case with Holzer, Block, Cheatham, and Knott (1993) who use data from 390 applicants
to the Michigan Job Opportunity Bank-Upgrade program from 1987-1989, Bartel (1994) who use data
from 495 American firms, as well as Ballot and Taymaz (2001) who use data from 90 firms in France
and 270 firms in Sweden.
6Much in the same way as when determining the impact of training on wages, one
should consider the fact that workplaces who oﬀer training may be unobservably diﬀer-
ent from those who do not. If workplaces who oﬀer training are also more productive
for unobserved reasons (for example, because of higher managerial ability), estimated
returns to training will be upwardly biased. Many earlier studies do not take into
account this likely possibility.7
Not surprisingly, more recent work has shown that controlling for the endogeneity
in the training decisions does matter. Recent papers such as Almeida and Carneiro
(2009) and Zwick (2006) use a large panel of respectively Portuguese and German firms
and still find sizable productivity returns to training even after taking into account en-
dogenous firm-level training decisions using a mix of firm fixed eﬀects and instrumental
variables. The study by Almeida and Carneiro (2009) is even more interesting as it
is one of the very few that provides an estimate of the internal rate of return of firm
investments in human capital, using detailed information on the costs of training.
In particular, the impact of training on productivity appears at least as high, if
not much higher, than its impact on wages. Estimating how the surplus generated by
training activities is divided between firms and workers is the exact focus of a crop
of recent working papers that, using firm-level data, replicate the earlier findings of
Barron, Berger, and Black (1999), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998), Barron, Black,
and Loewenstein (1989) and Bishop (1991). In Italy, Conti (2005) finds that firms
reap more of the returns to training than do workers. For Germany, Kuckulenz (2007)
finds that the impact of training on productivity is three times higher than its impact
on wages. Lopes and Teixeira (2010) use data from Spain and find that 2/3 of the
productivity gains from training are captured by firms.8
We also find that the impact of training on productivity is larger than its impact on
wages. We also allow the impact of training to vary according to the age of the workers
who receive training, again something that has not been done before and is a primary
focus of this paper.
7That is the case for Holzer, Block, Cheatham, and Knott (1993), Bartel (1994)Black and Lynch
(1996) and Barrett and O’Connell (2001).
8However, some other studies find a more equal sharing of the gains (see Dearden, Read, and Reenen
(2006) and Konings and Vanormelingen (2010)).
73. Data
Our data come from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) conducted by Sta-
tistics Canada.9 WES has been conducted annually since 1999 and we use all 7 years of
available data (1999 2005). The survey is both longitudinal and linked in that it doc-
uments the characteristics of workers and workplaces over time. The target population
for the workplace component of the survey is defined as the collection of all Canadian
establishments who paid employees in March of the year of the survey. The sample
comes from the “Business Register” of Statistics Canada, which contains information on
every business operating in Canada. The survey is therefore nationally representative
of Canadian businesses. For workplaces, the initial 1999 sample is followed over time
and is supplemented at two-year intervals with a sample of births selected from units
added to the Business Register since the last survey occasion.10,11
For the employee component, the target population is the collection of all employees
working, or on paid leave, in the workplace target population. Employees are sampled
from an employees list provided by the selected workplaces. For every workplace, a
maximum number of 24 employees is selected and for establishments with less than 4
employees, all employees are sampled. WES selects new employees and workplaces in
odd years (at every third year for employees and at every fifth year for workplaces).
4. The incidence of training over age
Figure 1 summarizes how FSC training incidences vary with age for each 5-years
age group between 35 and 65. Referring to the Figure and the following two summary
statistics Tables, we keep only workers from the initial and the re-sampling years. For
comparison purposes, they show how the incidence of on-the-job training vary with
age. Figure 1 shows that the incidence of FSC training is relatively stable until age
50 but then drops precipitously. In contrast, the decline in the incidence of on-the-
job training starts even earlier. Irrespective of the type, the incidence of training for
workers aged between 60 and 64 is much lower than for younger workers.
Table 1 shows how the incidence of FSC training varies over three age groups for
some subsamples. Overall, close to 37% of workers aged 35 to 44 received FSC training
- whereas the incidence drops to about 30% for workers aged 55 to 64. Furthermore,
9This is a restricted-access data set available in Statistics Canada network of Research Data Centers
(RDC). Remote access is also possible.
10Except for those located in Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut and firms operating in
fisheries, agriculture and cattle farming.
11In order to control for the design eﬀect in our estimations, we weighted our analysis with the final
sampling weights for workplaces as recommended by Statistics Canada.
8we observe FSC training participation rates dropping with age for almost all categories
of worker, no matter the union status, the industry, the firm size, the occupation or
technology use.12
Table 2 shows that the intensity of FSC training measured as its duration in days
(conditional on receiving classroom training) also diminishes with age. It is also impor-
tant to note that this measure is a lower bound on total number of days of classroom
training since the survey only asks for the duration of the two longest training episodes
undertaken by the worker in the past year. Numbers shown are obtained by adding
the number of days of both episodes.
WES is also one of the very few surveys containing information on two related
questions of interest. We first summarize in Table 2 reasons reported by workers for
refusing to undertake FSC training that was oﬀered by the workplace. Not surprisingly,
older workers are more likely to report refusing FSC training because they are too old.
This could be because they do not have time to recoup their investment. However,
older workers are also more likely to refuse FSC training because they deem the oﬀered
courses not suitable. This might suggest that the current forms of FSC training are
not adequate for the needs of older workers. Finally, the last part of Table 2 shows
additional information about the type of FSC training undertaken. Older workers
appear slightly less likely to follow training on the topic of occupational health and
safety and slightly less likely to get managerial or supervisory training - nonetheless,
the diﬀerences with younger workers are very small in both cases.
4.1. Statistical model. In order to assess whether the fall in the incidence of FSC
training with age shown in Figure 1 is due to the confounding eﬀects of other covariates,
we estimate the link between the probability of receiving FSC training and age in a
regression framework. To measure changes in the probability of receiving FSC training
with age, we construct a sample of workers where we exclude workers aged 35 and below
(32, 956 observations) as well as workers aged over 65 (6, 926 observations). We also
drop workers in non-profit organizations (16, 095 observations) or in part-time work
(4, 339 observations). Estimation results for the probability model are thus based on a
sample of 75, 644 observations.
We use a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether worker i in workplace j at time t undertook FSC training (trclsijt = 1) in
the past year:
(4.1) P
 
trclsijt = 1
 
=  ( Xijt),
12The exception to this are workers in Information and cultural industries and workers in Sales.
9where Xijt is a vector of explanatory variables including demographic characteristics
of the worker (sex, ethnicity, marital status and education), some characteristics of the
job (seniority, whether the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement),
firm size as well as complete sets of year, occupation and industry dummies. Table 3
shows summary statistics for demographic and human capital characteristics used in
this probit analysis.
The longitudinal and linked nature of WES requires special care in computing the
standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients. As a result, standard errors for equa-
tion (4.1), and all subsequent equations, are bootstrapped (Donald and Lang (2007))
in order to take into account residual clustering at the worker and workplace levels.
Statistics Canada provides sets of average bootstrap weights for such purposes. It
is also important to note that this method of computing standard errors also takes
into account worker and workplace unobserved heterogeneity as well as the stratified
sampling procedure used by Statistics Canada.
4.2. Results. Results from the probit model are presented in Table 4. We present
only marginal eﬀects (computed at the average value of each explanatory variables).
We find significant drops in the probability of receiving FSC training after age 50, even
after taking into account many worker and workplace characteristics. More specifically,
we find that the probability of a worker aged 50 to 54 receiving FSC training is 5.7
points lower than for a worker aged 35 to 39. Drops in the probability of receiving FSC
training are even bigger for older workers ( 6.4 for workers aged 55 to 59 and  7.9 for
workers aged 60 to 64). Given an average training incidence of 37% for workers aged
35 to 44, the magnitude of the estimated marginal eﬀect represents a drop of more
than 15% in the probability of receiving classroom training.
Similar results are found using other Canadian data sets (usually using the Adult and
Education Training Survey (AETS) or the WES). Using the WES, Lin and Tremblay
(2003) examine the link between age and training. Their summary statistics show
declining levels of training with age for both classroom and on-the-job training. Hansen
and Belzil (2006) confirm these findings in a regression framework, noting that the
drop with age seems more acute with on-the-job rather than oﬀ-the-job (or general)
training.13
13These results are confirmed by other studies using the AETS by Underhill (2006), Peters (2004)
and Hum and Simpson (2001).
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Marginal eﬀects for other covariates are in line with the literature. For example,
individuals with more years of education are more likely to receive FSC training, pos-
sibly because of higher returns in workplaces that employ such workers (Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1987)). We also find a positive link between workplace size and the prob-
ability of receiving FSC training, which can be generally explained by more binding
constraints in the financing of training faced by smaller workplaces. Furthermore, we
find that women are less likely to receive FSC training, that there is no significant
impact of seniority on FSC training, and that there is a small positive impact of being
covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
4.3. Robustness check: unobserved worker heterogeneity. It should be noted
that these results might be biased, for example, if workers who are more productive
for unobserved reasons are both more likely to stay active in the job market as they
get older and also more likely to undertake training. We are somewhat limited in our
ability to use the structure of the data to take such a scenario into account as workers
are observed at most for two years in the data and about 20% of the workers are
observed only for one year (because they then move to another workplace outside the
sample).
Given these limitations of the data, we can nonetheless include worker fixed eﬀects
in a linear probability model. If we do so, we observe an even more dramatic decrease
in the probability of receiving classroom training with age. The drops in probabil-
ity points are 3.0 for individuals aged 45 to 49, 6.0 for individuals aged 50 to 54,
12.4 for individuals aged 55 to 59 and finally 21.2 for those aged between 60 and 64.
Consequently, we conclude that our previous results are robust to taking into account
unobserved worker eﬀects.
5. Estimating age specific wage returns
5.1. Statistical model. In order to estimate the impact of firm-sponsored classroom
training on workers’ wages, we use a typical log-wage specification. Because of the
structure of our data, we take into account both individual and workplace heterogeneity,
using a two-factor analysis of covariance with repeated observations along the lines of
Abowd and Kramarz (1999b):
(5.1) yit = µ+ xit +⇢trclsijt + ✓i +  j + ✏it,
with
(5.2) ✓i = ↵i + ui⌘,
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where yit is the (log) wage rate observed for individual i = 1, ..., N at time t = 1, ..., Ti.
Worker eﬀects are denoted by i, workplace eﬀects by j, and time eﬀects by t. µ is
a constant, xit is a matrix containing demographic information for worker i at time
t as well as information concerning workplace j to which worker i is linked. trclsijt is
defined as before and ⇢ is the return to such training. Worker heterogeneity (✓i) is a
measure of unobserved (↵i) and observed (ui⌘) time-invariant worker characteristics.
Note that one of these unobserved characteristics is the amount of training the worker
has received with previous employers. Employer heterogeneity ( j) captures workplace-
specific unobserved characteristics common to all workers of the same workplace. ✏it is
the statistical residual.
We estimate equation (5.1) using two diﬀerent methods. First, we drop  j and treat
✓i as fixed eﬀects. Recall that distinguishing workplace from individual fixed eﬀects
requires that we observe the same worker across diﬀerent firms. But the WES sampling
procedure does not follow workers who move from one firm to another. As such,
separate worker and workplace fixed eﬀects are not identified.14 Given the inability
of the WES to capture interfirm mobility, ✓i is eﬀectively interpreted as a measure of
worker and workplace unobserved characteristics.
Second, we use an estimation method suggested by Abowd and Kramarz (1999b)
who propose a mixed model in which worker and firm eﬀects are treated as random.
This method involves making some additional distributional assumptions about the
unobserved characteristics in order to distinguish between worker and workplace un-
observed heterogeneity. However, the model we use is distinct from standard random
eﬀects models in that some correlation is permitted between the design matrix of the
worker and firm eﬀects with other covariates. In particular, it allows both unobserved
worker heterogeneity and unobserved workplace heterogeneity to be correlated with
current training decisions.
Allowing for such correlation is important as it is expected that more productive
workers are both more likely to receive FSC training as well as earn higher wages. It
is also possible that better managed workplaces oﬀer higher salaries and more FSC
training. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide estimates of the impact of
training on wages while explicitly taking into account how both sources of unobserved
heterogeneity aﬀect training decisions. It is expected that not taking these correlations
into account will lead to an upward bias in estimated returns to FSC training.
A detailed description of the estimation procedure is presented in Abowd and Kra-
marz (1999b) and summarized in the Appendix to this paper. Briefly, parameters
14This data constraint also precludes the inclusion of worker-firm match eﬀects.
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estimates are obtained in two steps. We first use Restricted Maximum Likelihood
(REML) to obtain parameter estimates for variance components. We then solve the
so-called Henderson’s Mixed Model Equations to get estimates for the other param-
eters in the full model (5.1). Solving the mixed equations simultaneously yield the
Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE) of the fixed eﬀects and Best Linear Unbiased
Predictors (BLUP) of the random eﬀects.
The main drawback of this second method is its use of additional assumptions about
the distribution of the unobserved eﬀects. However, the information embedded in
these additional assumptions allow a much more precise estimation of the age-specific
returns to training, while still allowing FSC decisions to be correlated with worker and
workplace observed characteristics.
5.2. Results. Results from estimating equation (5.1) are presented in Table 5 as well
as those obtained using OLS and FE for comparison. Estimated coeﬃcients can be
interpreted as the approximate percentage wage premium for having undertaken FSC
training in the past year.
On average, the wage-returns to FSC training are relatively low compared to several
previously published estimates while in line with more recent work (for example Bas-
sanini (2006)). On average, returns to FSC are close to 3.5% in the OLS model, 0.6%
in the FE model, and closer to 1% in the mixed model. However, the three models
provide similar conclusions with respect to how the FSC wage premium vary with age:
once we allow returns to vary with age, we find that returns to FSC training are lower
for older workers.
Focusing on results for the mixed model, we find that for workers aged between 35
and 44, having received some FSC training raises hourly wage by 1.2%. The wage
premium drops further to 0.9% for workers aged between 45 and 54 and rapidly even
further to 0.7% for workers aged 55 to 64 (and is not statistically diﬀerent for older
workers). Note that the drop in the wage premium with age is steeper in the FE
and mixed models compared to OLS results, as expected, as workers who are more
productive for unobserved reasons are more likely to received training as well as earn
higher wages.
We note that the decline seems modest at best as return to training on wages are
low to begin with. Nonetheless, this declining return should be taken into account in
addition to the lower time horizon available to recoup the training investment when
trying to explaining the declining incidence of FSC training with age.
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5.3. Robustness check: taking into account the intensity of FSC. One problem
with the previous results is the use of the incidence of FSC training rather than quantity
of FSC training. Without duration information, there is no basis for judging whether a
coeﬃcient is large or small. We already have shown in Table 2 the the duration of FSC
training diminishes with age. Could the drop in FSC training duration explains the
lower wage returns for older workers? To verify this, we estimate a modified version of
equation (5.1) in which the duration of FSC training (T ) in days as defined in section
3 is allowed to have an impact on wages:
(5.3) yit = µ+ xit +⇢f(T ) + ✓i +  j + ✏it.
By choosing f(T ) = T , we nonetheless find that the returns to an additional day of
FSC training is significantly lower for an older worker. More specifically, we find that
each additional day of training raises wages by 0.25% for an average worker but only
by 0.17% for an older worker, both eﬀects being statistically diﬀerent from zero at the
1% level.
However, Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) have nicely illustrated how the choice of
functional form for f(T ) is important. Once we settle on a cubic root specification,
we again find lower returns for older workers. Quite interestingly, we find that for all
age groups, the return to an additional day of FSC training decreases as the length of
training increases. However, we find no evidence that this decline also accelerates with
the length of training.
6. Estimating age specific productivity returns
6.1. Statistical model. Estimation of the training productivity premium in a produc-
tion function framework requires information on the inputs and output at the workplace
level. Luckily, we have a relatively precise measure of workplace productivity (our de-
pendent variable) in value added - defined as gross operating revenue minus expenses
on intermediary inputs, training expenses and additional labor costs. Labor is mea-
sured through the number of employees in the workplace (as of the end of March of the
current year). Measuring the stock of capital is somewhat more diﬃcult. As with most
firm-level data, capital stocks for each firm are not available. We discuss the likely
impact of this missing variable in subsection 6.3.
For a measure of the firm’s human capital investments, we use information on the
workers linked to the workplace. Specifically, we obtain from the worker part of the
survey the worker’s age and whether the worker took part in any FSC in the past year
in order to construct shares of workers who received training by age. In estimating the
14
production function, we distinguish between three age groups: less than 35, between
35 and 54 and more than 54. Using a finer classification is limited by the fact that
we only observe a sample of workers from each workplace and sampling errors lead to
less precise estimates of the shares as the number of age groups increases. It should be
noted that these constructed shares are only an approximation of the real proportion
of workers receiving training in each age group. However, since workers are selected
at random, they are unbiased estimates of the real shares. Because of the sampling
process, it is expected our estimates will be more noisy than those that would be
obtained if the complete set of workers were sampled.
It should also be noted that the WES includes detailed information on workplace-
level organizational changes. This information allows us to control explicitly for re-
organization within the firm that might be correlated with training decisions.
We use a Cobb-Douglas production function where the dependent variable is the
value added in workplace j at time t (Qjt)
(6.1) lnQjt =  L lnLE jt +  Zjt + ✏jt.
LEjt is a measure of eﬀective labor and Zjt includes controls for industry, year and
organizational changes. Summary statistics on Z are presented in Table 6. ✏jt is a
residual error term.
Our measure of eﬀective labor (LE) depends on the number of employees who re-
ceived classroom training (LT ) and the number of employees who did not receive any
such training (LNT ). If we do not distinguish workers by age, it is then defined as
(6.2) L Ejt =  TLTjt +  NTLNTjt =  NTLjt + ( T    NT )LTjt
where L is the total number of employees.  T and  NT are load factors converting
the number of employees who received and did not receive FSC training into eﬀective
labor. By taking the natural log on each side of equation 6.2, we can approximate LEjt
by
(6.3) lnLEjt ⇡ ln NT + lnLjt + ln
✓
1 +
✓
 T
 NT
  1
◆
Pjt
◆
where we define Pjt as the proportion of employees who received training.15
Substituting equation (6.3) in (6.1), we obtain
(6.4) lnQjt ⇡  0 +  L lnLjt +  K lnKjt +  LPjt +  Zjt + ✏jt
15The approximation is correct as long as L
T
L
⇣
 T
 NT
  1
⌘
is close to zero.
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where  =
⇣
 T
 NT
  1
⌘
is the parameter of interest and is interpreted as the relative
productivity of an employee who received training compared to an employee who did
not.
Modifying equation (6.4) to take into account the age of the worker receiving FSC is
relatively straightforward. It involves disaggregating Pjt into shares of workers receiving
training into each of the three age groups and adding shares of workers who did not
received training for two other age groups.
6.2. Results. Production function estimates are presented in Table 7. Given that the
coeﬃcient on the natural logarithm of total employment is approximately close to one,
other coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the productivity diﬀerentials between the given
age group relative to the omitted category (workers aged less than 35 who did not
receive any classroom training). For example, results show that classroom training
raises the productivity of a worker aged less than 35 by 37%.
To obtain the productivity measures of classroom training for a worker aged 35 to
44, one simply needs to subtract from the estimated productivity diﬀerential (45%)
the amount due to life cycle eﬀects (24.7%). This yields returns for the 35 to 44 age
group of 20.3%. We acknowledge the use of the term net return could be misleading:
keeping in mind that this return is not a true return on investment as we do not take
into account the cost of training.
Together, these results show a significant drop in returns to classroom training with
age. The estimated returns on productivity further drops to 5.4% for a worker aged
above 55. These results provide strong evidence that the returns to classroom training
on productivity decline with age. Moreover, the magnitude of the decline is quite large.
6.3. Robustness check: unobserved workplace heterogeneity. As noted by Bar-
rett and O’Connell (2001), productivity is a function of the stock of workers’ skills, not
the flow of training. Results obtained by regressing current productivity on training
flows are therefore diﬃcult to interpret, given that the stock of workers’ skills is in-
cluded in the error term in the previous regression framework.16 In fact, the previous
results might provide a good approximation of the age-returns gradient but the returns
within age group appear to be rather large.
Given the lack of data on the stock of training or training histories, one possible
path to follow is to assume that this stock is included in an unobserved workplace
16This is in addition to the previously mentioned missing capital stock.
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fixed eﬀect ( j). Let
(6.5) ✏jt =  j + ⌘jt.
Estimating the production function with this specification of the error term provides
much more reasonable productivity returns to FSC training. On average, workers who
received FSC provide a statistically significant 7.5% more additional value added.
The FSC training returns estimates are, however, much less precise once we allow this
return to vary with age. While the fact that we only observe a sample of workers in each
workplace does not aﬀect too adversely the standard errors of our OLS estimates, there
is not enough within firm variations to precisely estimate the returns to FSC training
in the FE model. Nonetheless, by taking the point estimates at face value, they are
consistent with the OLS results, namely that the impact of FSC on productivity is
dramatically lower for older workers. That is, we find that a worker aged less than 44
provides 5.8% more value added with FSC than a worker with no FSC. Returns for
workers aged 45 to 54 are even slightly higher to 6.8% and returns for the oldest age
group are slightly negative. Again, we note that these coeﬃcients are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, even after taking into account unobserved heterogeneity
at the workplace level, we still observe a very steep decline in the impact of FSC training
on productivity for older workers.
It is important to note that these last estimates do not take into account another
potential source of bias in estimating the production function. For example, it is likely
that a workplace that faces an unexpected increase in the demand for its product
will temporarily shift more resources away from training to production. Likewise,
a workplace facing a temporary downturn in demand for its product might increase
training for its employees. If such is the case, unobserved productivity shocks will
be negatively correlated to the proportion of employees who received training and
estimated returns will be biased downward.
There are a number of econometric procedures that have been proposed to deal with
these particular sources of bias. For example, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest
inverting the demand function for capital or materials in order to infer a value for the
unobserved productivity shock. The estimated productivity shock is then used as an
additional regressor in the production function.17,18 These rely on the assumption that
the inversion function is non stochastic. However, this assumption is satisfied if and
only if factor prices are the same across firms. But then, this also implies that labor and
17See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for complete details.
18Similar estimators are presented by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) and Olley and Pakes (1996).
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the good used in the inverse mapping function are collinear. This helps in explaining
why the estimates obtained with these methods are generally very imprecise. The proof
of this argument is given by Gorodnichenko (2010), but the criticism is also raised by
Bond and Soderbom (2005), Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) and Basu (1999).
An alternative method is suggestd by Blundell and Bond (2000). They use dynamic
panel GMM methods through which lagged inputs are used as instruments for current
input choices. However, Gorodnichenko (2010) shows that the Blundell and Bond
(2000) estimator is in general weakly identified. In our case, the problem of weak
instruments would be compounded by the sampling error of the labor input of the
production function as we only observe a sample of workers in each workplace. We
can’t find a good reason why unobserved productivity shocks would change our previous
conclusion about how returns to FSC would vary with age even though returns within
age groups could potentially diﬀer.
6.4. Comparing productivity to wage returns. In this section, we highlight two
implications that follows from our findings. First, the estimated impact of FSC training
on productivity is much greater than its impact on wages. This suggest that workplaces
rather than workers reap the majority of the benefits of classroom training. This
finding is consistent with those of Lopes and Teixeira (2010), Kuckulenz (2007) and
Conti (2005).
Second, given diminishing probabilities of receiving FSC training with age, we esti-
mate both declines in wage and productivity-returns. Results show that productivity
returns decline much more drastically with age than do wage returns. This suggests
that the workplace’s incentive to invest in classroom training is much lower for older
workers, as FSC training is not very eﬀective in raising older workers’ productivity.
This further suggests that eﬀorts to increase FSC training for older workers in its
current form is unlikely to yield important productivity gains. Whether alternative
forms of FSC training tailor made and targetted to older age groups are likely to yield
positive returns remains an open question.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that older workers are much less likely to undertake FSC
training than their younger counterparts. In addition to the shorter time to recoup
their training investment, we underscore two additional, yet related, reasons why this
is so: both the wage training premium and the productivity gains to classroom training
diminish with age. Furthermore, we show that the decrease in productivity gains is
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much greater than the decrease in the wage premium with age. This last result reflects
the fact that workplaces reap most of the gains from training for younger workers
and that the productivity premium of FSC training for older workers is close to zero.
Collectively, these results suggest that increasing the levels of FSC training for older
workers is unlikely to yield large productivity gains.
An interesting issue that warrants further investigation is whether the decline in the
productivity returns with age is due to reduced abilities to learn by older workers or a
lack of productivity enhancing FSC training toward older workers.19
Finally, there are also a number of channels other than productivity through which
classroom training could have beneficial eﬀects on the workplace. An interesting possi-
bility would be the presence of complementarities in training younger and older workers.
It is also possible that classroom training for older workers has beneficial impacts on
other measures of workplace performance such as innovation or the retention of older
workers (Picchio and van Ours (2011). Such questions are left for future research.
19In fact, there is evidence that older workers need specialized kinds of training - especially to deal
with new information technologies (Goldberg (1999)).
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Appendix A. Hypotheses of the Wage Mixed Model
With respect to the distributional assumptions, ↵ and  are taken to be normally
distributed:
(A.1)
264 ↵ 
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and
⌃i = V (✏i) .(A.3)
E
"
✓
 
  X, trcls# = 0(A.4)
V
"
✓
 
  X, trcls# = ⌦(A.5)
Two important points should be made about the estimates
⇣
 ˆ, ⇢ˆf , ⌘ˆ, ↵ˆ,  ˆ
⌘
. First,
mixed model solutions
⇣
 ˆ, ⇢ˆf , ⌘ˆ, ↵ˆ,  ˆ
⌘
converge to the least squares solutions for the
fixed eﬀects as |⌦| ! 1 (if ⇤ =  2✏IN⇤). In this sense, fixed eﬀects estimates are a
special case of the mixed model solutions. Second, unlike the usual random eﬀects
specification considered in the econometric literature, (5.1) and (A.1) do not assume
that the random eﬀects are orthogonal to the design (X and U , trcls and U) of the
fixed eﬀects ( , ⇢f and ⌘). This in particular allows some correlation between training
decisions (trclsijt) and unobserved characteristics of the worker (✓) and the workplace
( ).
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Appendix B. Tables
Table 1. Incidence of Classroom Training versus Age
35-44 45-54 55-64 Total
Total participation rate 35.7 34.7 28.9 34.4
by union status
Covered by a CBA 35.2 33.1 28.4 33.5
Non-covered 38.1 39.9 30.3 37.6
by industry
Forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction 46.0 44.6 38.8 44.7
Primary product manufacturing 34.9 34.6 26.8 33.5
Secondary product manufacturing 42.3 29.4 27.1 35.0
Labour intensive, tertiary manufacturing 25.6 20.7 12.9 21.9
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing 38.6 36.1 26.6 35.7
Construction 32.5 32.1 21.3 31.0
Transport, warehousing an wholesale trading 37.8 32.5 26.4 34.0
Communication and other utilities 62.1 57.6 51.8 58.9
Retail trade and consumer service 23.3 25.9 24.4 24.4
Finance and Insurance 58.4 53.9 53.7 56.1
Real estate, rental and leasing operations 31.9 29.3 30.3 30.5
Business service 39.1 39.7 31.5 38.2
Educ. and health services, and non-profit 40.2 44.4 48.3 43.5
Information and cultural industries 38.2 40.2 30.8 38.2
by firm size
1-10 employee 23.2 21.5 19.8 22.1
20-99 employee 35.0 34.0 30.0 33.9
100-499 employee 45.0 39.8 30.9 40.9
500 employee or more 54.8 53.8 43.8 52.9
by occupation
Manager 40.6 36.7 35.7 38.5
Professionnal 46.9 49.2 34.7 46.4
Technical/Trades 35.0 33.8 28.9 33.7
Sales 27.3 26.1 21.5 25.9
Clerical 32.1 31.7 26.9 31.3
Production 21.0 25.3 16.8 21.9
by technology use
Use computer 41.3 41.1 36.2 40.6
Use CAD 41.3 35.6 29.5 37.8
Use other technologies 35.6 31.5 27.5 33.1
Non-user 17.9 22.9 19.3 20.1
Note. WES 1999, 2001, 2003 & 2005. Number of observations: 47,256
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Table 2. Other Correlates of Classroom Training
35-44 45-54 55-64 Total
Days of classroom training 5.42 5.59 3.54 5.26
Reason for refusing training 35-44 45-54 55-64 Total
Too busy with duties on the job 0.47 0.49 0.35 0.47
Courses not suitable 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.28
Course too diﬃcult 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health reasons 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
Family responsabilities 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03
Too old/ too late in career 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.02
Other 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.18
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Type of Classroom Training 35-44 45-54 55-64 Total
Orientation for new employees 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Managerial/supervisory training 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
Professional training 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.17
Apprenticeship training 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Sales and marketing training 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Computer hardware 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Computer software 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18
Other oﬃce or non-oﬃce equipment 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Group decision-making or problem solving 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Team building, leadership, communication 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Occupational health 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.15
Literacy or numeracy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.29
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note. WES 1999, 2001, 2003 & 2005. Number of observations: 47,256
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Table 3. Summary statistics
Mean
Demographic characteristics
Women 0.42
Married 0.66
Black 0.01
Other ethnic origin 0.31
Age group
Aged between 35 and 39 0.23
Aged between 40 and 44 0.25
Aged between 45 and 49 0.21
Aged between 50 and 54 0.16
Aged between 55 and 59 0.10
Aged between 60 and 64 0.04
Total 1.00
Human capital
Less than a high school degree 0.13
High school degree 0.20
Trade or industry diploma 0.16
Some university 0.33
Bachelor degree 0.11
University degree above bachelor degree 0.05
Total 1.00
Selected job characteristics
Covered by a CBA 0.21
Seniority 11.08
(8.98)
Note. WES 1999-2005. Number of observations: 75,644.
Std. dev. in parenthesis (for continuous var.).
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Table 4. Marginal Eﬀects - Probability of Receiving Classroom Training
Probit FE LPM
Age group 35-39 years old - -
Age group 40-44 years old 0.013*** 0.010**
(0.001) (0.002)
Age group 45-49 years old -0.008*** -0.030***
(0.001) (0.002)
Age group 50-54 years old -0.035*** -0.060***
(0.001) (0.006)
Age group 55-59 years old -0.046*** -0.120***
(0.002) (0.007)
Age group 60-64 years old -0.096*** -0.204***
(0.002) (0.012)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. WES 1999-
2005. Number of observations: 75,644. * statistically significant
at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. Including controls for: demographic
characteristics, human capital, occupation, year, and industry.
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Table 5. Wage impact of classroom training versus age
OLS FE Mixed
Returns to classroom training
- aged less than 25 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
- aged between 25 and 34 0.031*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
- aged between 35 and 44 0.038*** 0.006*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
- aged between 45 and 54 0.031*** 0.001*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
- aged between 55 and 64 0.026*** 0.001* 0.007***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
- aged 65 or more -0.011** -0.013*** -0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. WES 1999-2005. R2 in
the OLS model is equal to 0.54. Number of observations: 113,427. * statisti-
cally significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. Including controls for: demographic
characteristics, human capital, occupation, year, and industry.
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Table 6. Summary statistics - Workplace-level variables
Variable Mean
Value added (in million $) 1.37
(17.51)
Total employment 14.68
(61.80)
Organisational change
Changes in business processes
Integration 0.09
Re-engineering 0.12
TQM 0.08
Changes in delegation
Centralization 0.06
Decentralization 0.03
Delayering 0.02
Dealings with other firms
Outsource 0.07
Collaboration 0.06
Industry
Natural ressources 0.01
Primary manufacturing 0.01
Secondary manufacturing 0.02
Labour tertiary 0.03
Capital tertiary 0.03
Construction 0.08
Transport 0.12
Communication 0.01
Retail 0.35
Finance and insurance 0.05
Real estate 0.04
Business services 0.12
Education and health care 0.09
Information and culture 0.02
Total 1.00
Note. WES 1999-2005. Number of observations:
30,563. Std. dev. in parenthesis (for continuous var.).
30
Table 7. Productivity impact of classroom training versus age
C=1 C=0 Impact
Aged between 35 and 44 0.364* REF 36.4%
(0.111)
Aged between 45 and 54 0.483*** 0.272*** 21.1%
(0.026) (0.026)
Aged between 55 and 64 0.309 0.266** 4.3%
(0.113) (0.050)
# observations 30,563
R-squared 0.60
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically significant
at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. Including controls for org. change, year, region and
industry.
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Figure 1. Source: WES 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005
Firm-Sponsored Classroom Training: Is it Worth
it for Older Workers - APPENDIX
November 9, 2011
1
Table 1: Appendix - Marginal E↵ects - Probit on Incidence of Training- Other
Coe cients
Demographic characteristics
Age group 35-39 years old -
Age group 40-44 years old 0.013***
(0.001)
Age group 45-49 years old -0.008***
(0.001)
Age group 50-54 years old -0.035***
(0.001)
Age group 55-59 years old -0.046***
(0.002)
Age group 60-64 years old -0.096***
(0.002)
Women -0.036***
(0.001)
Married 0.025***
(0.001)
Black 0.016***
(0.005)
Other race -0.021***
(0.001)
Immigrant -0.054***
(0.002)
Less than a high school degree -
High school degree 0.032***
(0.001)
Trade or industry diploma 0.127***
(0.001)
Some university 0.109***
(0.001)
Bachelor degree 0.103***
(0.002)
University degree above bachelor degree 0.166***
(0.005)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically
significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Table 1: Appendix - Marginal E↵ects - Probit on Incidence of Training- Other
Coe cients (Cont’d)
Job Characteristics
Seniority -0.000***
(0.000)
Seniority squared / 100 0.001***
(0.000)
Union Member -0.005***
(0.000)
Managers -
Professionals 0.010***
(0.003)
Technical/Trades -0.038***
(0.002)
Marketing/Sales -0.064***
(0.005)
Clerical/Administrative -0.081***
(0.003)
Production workers -0.128***
(0.003)
Workplace characteristics
1-19 employees -
20-99 employees 0.128***
(0.000)
100-499 employees 0.231***
(0.001)
500 employees and more 0.323***
(0.001)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * statistically significant at 10%; ** 5%, ***
1%.
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Table 1: Appendix - Marginal E↵ects - Probit on Incidence of Training- Other
Coe cients (Cont’d)
Forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction -
Primary product manufacturing -0.095***
(0.002)
Secondary product manufacturing -0.056***
(0.002)
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.140***
(0.003)
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.074***
(0.003)
Construction -0.017***
(0.004)
Transportation -0.006
(0.004)
Communication and other utilities 0.137***
(0.002)
Retail trade and consumer service -0.077***
(0.004)
Finance and insurance 0.204***
(0.004)
Real estate -0.010*
(0.005)
Business service -0.016***
(0.005)
Education and health service 0.098***
(0.006)
Information and cultural industries -0.071***
(0.004)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically
significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 1: Appendix - Marginal E↵ects - Probit on Incidence of Training- Other
Coe cients (Cont’d)
Year = 1999 -
Year = 2000 -0.017***
(0.001)
Year = 2001 -0.033***
(0.001)
Year = 2002 -0.045***
(0.001)
Year = 2003 0.012***
(0.001)
Year = 2004 -0.035***
(0.002)
Year = 2005 -0.015***
(0.002)
Number of observations 75644
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * statistically significant at 10%; ** 5%, ***
1%.
5
Table 2: Appendix - Coe cient estimates - Wage equation
OLS Mixed
Returns to classroom training
- aged less than 25 0.040*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
- aged between 25 and 34 0.031*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.001)
- aged between 35 and 44 0.038*** 0.012***
(0.000) (0.001)
- aged between 45 and 54 0.031*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
- aged between 55 and 64 0.026*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
- aged 65 or more -0.011** -0.007
(0.002) (0.008)
Demographic characteristics
Aged less than 25 - -
Aged between 25 and 34 0.063*** 0.049***
(0.000) (0.002)
Aged between 35 and 44 0.080*** 0.068***
(0.000) (0.002)
Aged between 45 and 54 0.084*** 0.077***
(0.000) (0.002)
Aged between 55 and 64 0.070*** 0.067***
(0.001) (0.002)
Aged 65 or more 0.028*** 0.048***
(0.000) (0.004)
Women -0.051*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.001)
Married 0.023*** 0.017***
(0.000) (0.001)
Black -0.022*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.004)
Other race 0.004*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.001)
Immigrant -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.000) (0.001)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically
significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2: Appendix - Coe cient estimates - Wage equation (Cont’d)
OLS Mixed
Less than a high school degree - -
High school degree 0.013*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001)
Trade or industry diploma 0.031*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.001)
Some university 0.039*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.001)
Bachelor degree 0.090*** 0.059***
(0.000) (0.002)
University degree above bachelor degree 0.125*** 0.082***
(0.001) (0.002)
Job Characteristics
Seniority 0.008*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
Seniority squared / 100 -0.025*** -0.014***
(0.000) (0.002)
Seniority cubed / 100 0.003*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Union Member 0.011*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.001)
Managers - -
Professionals -0.025*** -0.042***
(0.001) (0.002)
Technical/Trades -0.101*** -0.090***
(0.000) (0.001)
Marketing/Sales -0.146*** -0.131***
(0.001) (0.002)
Clerical/Administrative -0.132*** -0.122***
(0.001) (0.002)
Production workers -0.173*** -0.134***
(0.001) (0.002)
Part-time worker -0.030*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically significant
at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2: Appendix - Coe cient estimates - Wage equation (Cont’d)
OLS Mixed
Workplace characteristics
1-19 employees - -
20-99 employees 0.026*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001)
100-499 employees 0.054*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.002)
500 employees and more 0.071*** 0.051***
(0.001) (0.003)
Natural ressources - -
Primary product manufacturing -0.026*** -0.038***
(0.001) (0.006)
Secondary product manufacturing -0.039*** -0.044***
(0.001) (0.005)
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.096*** -0.086***
(0.001) (0.005)
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.022*** -0.041***
(0.001) (0.006)
Construction 0.008*** -0.006
(0.000) (0.005)
Transportation -0.038*** -0.048***
(0.001) (0.005)
Communication and other utilities -0.026*** -0.042***
(0.001) (0.006)
Retail trade and consumer service -0.138*** -0.106***
(0.000) (0.005)
Finance and insurance -0.005** 0.001
(0.001) (0.006)
Real estate -0.061*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.006)
Business service -0.036*** -0.046***
(0.001) (0.005)
Education and health service -0.041*** -0.063***
(0.001) (0.006)
Information and cultural industries -0.012** -0.040***
(0.001) (0.006)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically significant
at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2: Appendix - Coe cient estimates - Wage equation (Cont’d)
OLS Mixed
Year = 1999 - -
Year = 2000 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001)
Year = 2001 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 2002 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.001)
Year = 2003 0.043*** 0.046***
(0.000) (0.001)
Year = 2004 0.053*** 0.058***
(0.000) (0.001)
Year = 2005 0.058*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant 0.975*** 1.021***
(0.001) (0.005)
Number of sbservations 113427 113427
R-squared 0.54
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * sta-
tistically significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3: Appendix - Coe cient estimates (OLS) - Production function
Natural logarithm of total employment 0.945***
(0.014)
Proportion of employees aged between 35 and 44 undertaking classroom training 0.364***
(0.084)
Proportion of employees aged between 35 and 44 not undertaking classroom training -
Proportion of employees aged between 45 and 54 undertaking classroom training 0.483***
(0.070)
Proportion of employees aged between 45 and 54 not undertaking classroom training 0.272***
(0.050)
Proportion of employees aged between 55 and 64 undertaking classroom training 0.309***
(0.114)
Proportion of employees aged between 55 and 64 not undertaking classroom training 0.266***
(0.072)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3: Appendix - Coe cient estimates (OLS) - Production function (Cont’d)
Organisational change
Integration 0.118**
(0.053)
Re-engineering 0.062
(0.044)
Downsizing 0.004
(0.052)
TQM -0.027
(0.061)
Centralization 0.270***
(0.060)
Decentralization -0.049
(0.095)
Delayering -0.143
(0.107)
Outsource 0.091
(0.062)
Collaboration 0.153**
(0.067)
Proportion of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement 0.173*
(0.099)
Year = 1999 -
Year = 2000 0.008
(0.038)
Year = 2001 -0.087*
(0.047)
Year = 2002 -0.064
(0.052)
Year = 2003 -0.114**
(0.056)
Year = 2004 0.017
(0.055)
Year = 2005 0.018
(0.045)
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statistically significant at 10%; ** 5%, ***
1%.
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Table 3: Appendix - Coe cient estimates (OLS) - Production function (Cont’d)
Natural ressources -
Primary product manufacturing -0.222***
(0.072)
Secondary product manufacturing -0.126*
(0.070)
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.439***
(0.075)
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing -0.091
(0.094)
Construction -0.200***
(0.075)
Transportation 0.128
(0.079)
Communication and other utilities -0.392***
(0.074)
Retail trade and consumer service -0.743***
(0.075)
Finance and insurance -0.010
(0.081)
Real estate -0.379
(0.093)
Business service -0.269***
(0.082)
Education and health service 0.176
(0.073)
Information and cultural industries -0.356***
(0.085)
Constant 10.982***
(0.089)
Observations 30563
R-squared 0.60
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * statisti-
cally significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.
12
